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I. INTRODUCTION
Mutual fund investments now constitute 19% of United States 
households’ assets and an even more significant fraction of retirement
savings.1  The attempt by Congress and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC or Commission) to regulate mutual fund advisory
fees under section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 19402 
(Investment Company Act or Act) has resulted in a wealth of litigation, 
the vast majority of which has resulted in decisions upholding the 
challenged fees.3  The ninety-three million United States mutual fund 
1. INV. CO. INST., 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS 
AND ACTIVITY IN THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 8–9 (2009).  At year-end 2008,
U.S.-registered investment companies managed $10.3 trillion in assets. Id. at 8.  This  
figure represents a $2.6 trillion decline over year-end 2007, due largely to a 40% decline 
in major U.S. stock market indexes during the year. Id.
2. Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a-35(b) (2006). See Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-547, § 20, 84 Stat. 1413, 1428–29. 
3. See, e.g., James R. Carroll & David S. Clancy, ‘Excessive Fee’ Lawsuits, 
NAT’L L.J., May 26, 2008, at 12 (noting that the most recent wave of excessive fee 
lawsuits has resulted in multiple rulings in the mutual fund industry’s favor, while 
plaintiffs have neither prevailed in court nor garnered any public settlement requiring the 
return of advisory fees); John P. Freeman et al., Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: New 
Evidence and a Fair Fiduciary Duty Test, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 83, 86 (2008) (“[S]ection 
36(b) is impotent in practice.  Because of the impractical proof standard for succeeding 
in a 36(b) lawsuit, no plaintiff has ever won a fee case brought under section 36(b).”).
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investors have a vested interest in advisory fee levels.4  Small fee  
differences, cumulated over the life of an investment, can significantly
impact total returns.5  On the other hand, excessive fee litigation imposes 
costs on the mutual fund industry,6 and mutual fund directors must 
consider the potential for litigation when setting advisory fee schedules.7 
In light of plaintiffs’ nearly complete failure to prevail in excessive fee 
litigation and the prospect that the more restrictive standard the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals recently proposed may render shareholder 
recovery even more difficult,8 a growing body of evidence suggests that 
the fiduciary duty imposed by section 36(b) has not adequately protected
mutual fund shareholders from excessive advisory fees.9 
Section 36(b) expressly imposes a fiduciary duty on the investment
adviser with respect to payments the adviser receives from the fund in
exchange for advisory services.10  Congress expressly granted investment
2001) (noting that some investment advisers have agreed to prospectively reduce
advisory fees as a condition of settling section 36(b) lawsuits).
4. INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 7. In exchange for providing a fund with 
facilities, administrative staff, portfolio management, and other services, an investment
adviser charges the fund “an advisory fee based on a percentage of the average daily
value of the [f]und’s net assets.”  Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 
F.2d 923, 926 (2d Cir. 1982); see also infra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
5. PETER J. WALLISON & ROBERT E. LITAN, COMPETITIVE EQUITY: A BETTER WAY 
TO ORGANIZE MUTUAL FUNDS 74 (2007) (citing JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE 
SOUL OF CAPITALISM 161 (2005)) (noting that small advisory fee differences can reduce 
an investor’s total gain by 75% over a ten-year period). 
6. See Carroll & Clancy, supra note 3, at 12 (“[T]he recent wave of ‘excessive 
fee’ cases . . . has imposed significant litigation costs on the mutual fund industry, but it 
has not yielded judicial findings corroborating assertions that mutual fund fees are
disproportionate to the services provided.”). 
7. See Lori A. Martin & Martin E. Lybecker, It’s Too Early To Disregard the 
Gartenberg Factors During Advisory Fee Renewals (May 27, 2008), http://www.wilmerhale.
com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=8329 (“[B]oards of directors can 
clearly document that they have served as independent watchdogs on the management of
investment companies by continuing to review the nature and quality of the services
provided to the investment company and its shareholders.”).
8. See Grace Carter & Katharine Chao, The Future of Gartenberg: A New 
Approach in Evaluating Investment Adviser Fees 3 (May 2008), http://paulhastings. 
com/assets/publications/919.pdf?wt.mc_ID=919.pdf (“If other courts do follow [Harris
Associates], the Seventh Circuit’s approach will create greater protection for advisers 
against excessive fees claims when their fees are in line with the market.”).
9. See infra Part IV.C. 
10. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006) (“[T]he investment adviser of a registered 
investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt
of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such 


































company shareholders a private right of action as a means of enforcing 
this fiduciary duty.11  However, under the Gartenberg standard employed
by the majority of courts that have evaluated excessive fee claims under 
section 36(b),12 no plaintiff has ever successfully demonstrated a breach 
of this duty.13 Moreover, the replacement standard recently proposed by 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals does not bode well for the prospect 
of plaintiff recovery because it relies on comparisons to other mutual
fund fees prevailing in a market that many commentators condemn as 
lacking the level of competition necessary to fundamentally affect
prices.14 
Observers of the mutual fund market largely agree that the lack of 
competition for advisory services results from a governance structure 
riddled with conflicts of interest.15  In short, the investment adviser 
establishes a fund, elects its initial board of directors, and provides the 
fund with advisory and administrative services.16  The Investment 
adviser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser.”).  By incorporating the agency
concept of fiduciary duty, section 36(b) obligates an investment adviser to act loyally for
the mutual fund and its shareholders’ benefit in matters related to compensation for 
services and other payments paid by the fund or its shareholders to the adviser.  See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) (explaining the fiduciary duty in
general); see also S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 6 (1969), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4897, 4902 (“This bill states that the mutual fund investment adviser has a specific
‘fiduciary duty’ in respect to management fee compensation. . . .  [It] is in accordance
with the traditional function of the courts to enforce such fiduciary duties in similar type
relationships.”).
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (“An action may be brought under this 
subsection . . . by a security holder of such registered investment company . . . against
such investment adviser . . . .”); S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 7, as reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4903 (“Under [section 36(b)] either the SEC or a shareholder may
sue in court on a complaint that a mutual fund’s management fees involve a breach of
fiduciary duty.”). 
12. See Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 
1982). Only the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected the Gartenberg approach 
to mutual fund advisory fee litigation.  See infra Part IV.C.3.
13. Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 86. 
14. See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The
trustees (and in the end investors, who vote with their feet and dollars), rather than a
judge or jury, determine how much advisory services are worth.”), cert. granted, 129 S.
Ct. 1579 (2009).  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals intimated that it would find that 
an investment adviser had breached its fiduciary duty only if it charged an advisory fee 
so unusual that the court might infer “deceit must have occurred.”  Id.
15. See, e.g., Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 87–89 (discussing mutual funds’ 
conflicted management structure). 
16. S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 5, as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4901 
(“Mutual funds, with rare exception, are not operated by their own employees.  Most 
funds are formed, sold, and managed by external organizations, that are 
separately owned and operated.”).  Following the adviser’s election of a mutual fund’s 
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Company Act imposes stringent regulations regarding the board members’ 
qualifications, mandates that “disinterested”17 directors comprise a 
fraction of the board, and governs the directors’ conduct in approving 
the advisory services contract.18  Notwithstanding these constraints, the
conflicts of interest inherent in a mutual fund’s governance structure 
generally prevent the fund’s board of directors from firing the initial 
investment adviser-sponsor in favor of another adviser who might 
charge lower fees.19 
Although section 36(b) indicates that shareholders may bring an action 
against the persons enumerated in section 36(a)20—including investment 
company directors21—section 36(b)(3) substantially qualifies that right 
by disallowing suits “against any person other than the recipient of such 
compensation.”22  A mutual fund’s board of directors derives no
directors “at an annual or a special meeting duly called for that purpose.”  15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-16(a) (2006).  However, funds can—and do—dispense with shareholder meetings, 
meaning mutual fund directors often do not stand for periodic reelection. See  LOUIS 
LOWENSTEIN, THE INVESTOR’S DILEMMA: HOW MUTUAL FUNDS ARE BETRAYING YOUR 
TRUST AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 81, 169 (2008). 
17. “The [Investment Company Act] requires that at least forty percent of 
an investment company’s directors be ‘disinterested,’ and that every agreement with an
investment adviser be approved by a majority of the disinterested directors.”  Migdal v.
Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 329 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).  For
the various categories of relationships that render a director “interested” under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a-2(19), see infra note 44. 
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(19), -10(a), -15(c) (2006). 
19. See Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d at 631 (“Few mutual funds ever change advisers, 
and plaintiffs conclude from this that the market for advisers is not competitive.”); S. 
REP. NO. 91-184, at 5, as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4901 (“[A] mutual fund
cannot, as a practical matter[,] sever its relationship with the adviser.”); WALLISON & 
LITAN, supra note 5, at 71 (“Unless the advisers themselves face competition from other 
advisers . . . the prices they offer to the funds they manage will never reflect the low 
costs to investors that competition could produce.”); John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn
Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence and Implications for 
Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 159 (2007) (“It is thus a second aspect of the perceived 
conflict—one unique to the fund industry—that is crucial to the critics’ belief that
advisory fees are unconstrained by competition.  This second aspect is based on the 
empirical fact that mutual fund boards of directors rarely ‘fire’ advisers and do not put 
advisory contracts up for bid among advisers—which we do not dispute.”). 
20. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006). 
21. Id. § 80a-35(a)(1). 
22. Id. § 80a-35(b)(3); see Pfeiffer v. Integrated Fund Servs., 371 F. Supp. 2d 502,
509–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing excessive fee complaint against fund officers when 
plaintiff failed to allege that fund officers received administrative or transfer agent fees);
Tarlov v. Paine Webber Cashfund, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 429, 436 (D. Conn. 1983) (“Only

























beneficial compensation from an excessive advisory fee.23  Accordingly,
shareholders have no cause of action under the Investment Company Act 
against mutual fund boards of directors that approve excessive advisory
fee contracts.24  Thus, one can reasonably argue that fund directors have
little incentive to faithfully fulfill their fiduciary duties to fund 
shareholders by bargaining at arm’s length with the investment adviser 
when the advisory contract comes up for approval.25 
Two conclusions are especially relevant to the issue of investment 
adviser compensation.  First, the insurmountable burden of proof that the 
Gartenberg test imposes has universally prevented plaintiff shareholder 
recovery in excessive fee actions brought under section 36(b).26  Second,
mutual funds’ conflicted governance structure has stifled competition 
and allowed investment advisers to continue charging exorbitant 
advisory fees.27  As a solution, this Comment proposes that Congress 
and the Commission implement a system of penalty default rules aimed
at fostering more efficient arm’s length negotiation between fund 
23. See, e.g., In re Dreyfus Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 428 F. Supp. 2d 342, 351–52
(W.D. Pa. 2005) (dismissing section 36(b) claims when plaintiffs’ only allegation
regarding payments to directors consisted of claim that directors received excessively
high salaries); Jerozal v. Cash Reserve Mgmt., Inc., No. 81 Civ. 1569, 1982 WL 1363, at 
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1982) (“[T]he numerous parties subject to liability under section 
36(b) are only liable for receipt of compensation or payments for investment advisory
services.”).
24. Section 36(a) of the Act authorizes the SEC to bring civil actions against 
mutual fund board members who “engage in any act or practice constituting a breach of
fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct.”  15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (2006).  Although
courts have historically recognized an implied right of action under section 36(a),
modern courts have reversed course, holding that Congress did not intend to create a 
private cause of action in enacting section 36(a). Compare Strougo ex rel. Braz. Fund, 
Inc. v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 783, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(recognizing a private right of action under section 36(a)), with Olmsted v. Pruco Life 
Ins. Co., 283 F.3d 429, 433 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Congress’s explicit provision of a private 
right of action to enforce [section 36(b)] suggests that omission of an explicit private 
right to enforce other sections was intentional.”). See generally Arthur S. Gabinet & 
George M. Gowen III, The Past and Future of Implied Causes of Action Under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 3 VILL. J.L. & INVESTMENT MGMT. 45 (2002).
Moreover, some courts have held that section 36(b) provides an exclusive remedy with 
respect to excessive advisory fee claims, thereby preempting excessive advisory fee
claims brought under other sections of the Act. See Merine ex rel. Prudential-Bache 
Util. Fund, Inc. v. Prudential-Bache Util. Fund, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 715, 723 (S.D.N.Y.
1994); Tarlov, 559 F. Supp. at 436 (declining to imply causes of action to recover
excessive advisory fees under sections 1(b)(2), 15(a), 15(b), and 36(a) of the Act). 
25. Often, mutual fund directors hold only nominal personal stakes in the funds 
they manage.  See  LOWENSTEIN, supra note 16, at 76. Accordingly, many mutual fund 
directors have little personal financial incentive to keep advisory fees in check.
26. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
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directors and investment advisers, as well as encouraging investment
advisers to effectively compete on price.28 
Part II of this Comment provides a brief introduction to mutual funds,
the fund-investment adviser relationship, and the regulation of this 
relationship under the Investment Company Act.  Part III outlines the 
problem of excessive mutual fund advisory fees and provides some
contemporary evidence suggesting that advisory fees remain excessive
despite regulatory efforts. Part IV discusses mutual funds’ conflicted
governance structure, the lack of competition in the mutual fund market, 
and section 36(b)’s impotent shareholder remedy—all of which have 
served to perpetuate excessive advisory fees.  Finally, Part V offers a
proposal to implement a penalty default regime aimed at encouraging 
arm’s length negotiation between investment advisers and mutual funds’ 
independent directors.  Part V concludes by suggesting a more reserved 
proposal intended to introduce the mutual fund market to default rules’ 
efficacy. 
II. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO MUTUAL FUNDS 
An astonishing one-third of American families invest some portion of 
their savings in open-end investment companies—more commonly
known as mutual funds.29  Mutual funds give investors the option to 
purchase shares in pools of assets, generally including cash, securities, and 
securities options.30  This unique structure provides smaller, individual
investors with access to portfolio diversification and professional advisory 
28. For a discussion of penalty default rules, see infra Part V.A.1.  Default rules 
are a powerful component of libertarian paternalist regulation.  See RICHARD H. THALER 
& CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND 
HAPPINESS 83, 85 (2008).  The libertarian paternalist movement aims to allow entities to
make their own choices, while simultaneously attempting to influence those entities’
behavior in order to ensure that they make the most efficient, wealth-maximizing 
choices. See id. at 5.
29. MUTUAL FUND REGULATION § 1:1 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 2d ed. 2009); see 
also  INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 7 (indicating that mutual funds have over ninety
million investors in the United States).


























   
 
services.31  By the end of 2008, mutual funds in the United States held
combined assets of over ten trillion dollars.32 
Mutual fund shareholders rely on the prudent advice of investment 
advisers, who recommend to a fund’s board of directors where to invest
the company’s assets.33 Additionally, a fund’s adviser generally 
manages the fund’s portfolio transactions and employs all of the staff 
assigned to a particular fund.34  In exchange for its services, the 
investment adviser takes a fee calculated as a percentage of the fund’s
total assets.35 
A. The Investment Company Act of 1940 
This section outlines Congress’s effort to regulate investment 
advisers’ compensation through the Investment Company Act. As the 
discussion below will show, Congress has tried to regulate advisory fees 
indirectly—by setting the qualifications for mutual fund directors and 
specifying procedures for approving advisory services contracts—and
directly through shareholder litigation under section 36(b).36 
Originally, mutual funds—generally organized as corporations or 
business trusts37—were subject only to the laws of their state of 
31. WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 5, at 1. 
32. INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 9; see also supra note 1 (noting this figure 
represents a $2.6 trillion decline over year-end 2007).
33. HAZEN,  supra note 30, § 20.2; Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 84 (“[The]
portfolio management function is the single most important service performed for
actively managed mutual funds.”). 
34. MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra note 29, § 1:2.2; see also S. REP. NO. 91-
184, at 5 (1969), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4901 (“[A] typical 
[management] fund is organized by its investment adviser which provides it with almost 
all management services . . . .”).
35. MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra note 29, § 1:2.2.  Under a typical advisory 
fee schedule, the adviser charges a fee calculated as a percentage of net assets.  See id.
§ 7:2.3.  The adviser’s fee typically decreases as the mutual fund’s net asset value 
increases. See id. (noting that fee schedules use “breakpoints” as a means of passing on 
economies of scale generated as total assets increase).  For example, a typical investment
adviser might charge 0.60% of the first $1 billion in total assets, 0.575% of the next 
billion dollars in total assets, and so on, scaling down to 0.48% of total assets over $24
billion.  Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 974, 977 (D. Minn. 2007) 
(describing the fee schedule of American Express Funds’ Large Cap Equity Fund and 
New Dimensions Fund), rev’d, 561 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 2009). 
36. Direct regulation consists of ex post sanctions imposed when the regulated 
entity fails to comply with the law. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 
J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662 (1998).  In contrast, indirect regulation “regulates . . . other 
regulators so that they regulate the individual differently.”  Id. at 666. 
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incorporation.38  After widespread abuses in the investment company 
industry came to light in the wake of the Great Depression, Congress 
and the SEC adopted the Investment Company Act to regulate the 
conduct of mutual fund operators.39 
The Investment Company Act imposes a complex and comprehensive
regulatory scheme on mutual funds.40 Aside from the fiduciary duty 
contained in section 36(b), two categories of regulations bear 
substantially on the issue of adviser compensation: regulations governing
mutual fund boards of directors and regulations governing the advisory
contract.41 
1. Regulation of Directors 
Although investment advisers typically manage mutual funds’ day-to-
day operations, mutual funds, like all corporations, have boards of 
directors that oversee the investment adviser and otherwise represent 
shareholders’ interests.42  Recognizing that the close relationship
between mutual funds and their investment advisers might produce 
unreasonable fee structures, in 1970, Congress adopted independent
director requirements to limit the potential conflicts of interest that might 
arise in the advisory contract approval process.43  Accordingly, under
section 10(a) of the Investment Company Act, “interested persons”44 
38. See Philip H. Newman, Boards of Directors of Registered Investment
Companies, in  INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE 373, 375 (Am.
Law Inst.-Am. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Continuing Leadership in Prof’l Educ. ed., 2008)
(indicating investment companies are “creature[s] of state law” also subject to
the Investment Company Act). 
39. See MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra note 29, § 1:1. 
40. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006). 
41. For sections of the Investment Company Act regulating mutual fund boards of
directors, see, for example, id. § 80a-2(a)(19) (defining “interested person”); id. § 80a-10
(regulating affiliations or interest of directors, officers, and employees); id. § 80a-16 
(regulating boards of directors).  15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 governs contracts of investment
advisers and underwriters. 
42. AM. BAR ASS’N, FUND DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 5 (3d ed. 2006). 
43. See Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 537–38 (1984) (“In order to 
remedy . . . perceived inadequacies in the [1940] Act, the SEC submitted a series of 
legislative proposals to Congress that led to the 1970 Amendments to the Act.” (explaining 
the additions of 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10(a), -15(c))). 
44. Section 2(a)(19) defines “interested persons” to include: (1) persons affiliated
with the fund; (2) persons with family members affiliated with the fund; (3) interested
persons of the fund’s investment adviser or principal underwriter; (4) persons employed 




















    
 
 






may comprise no more than 60% of a mutual fund’s board of directors.45 
The Supreme Court has emphasized the “watchdog” role played by
mutual funds’ disinterested directors, noting that “Congress entrusted to 
the independent directors of investment companies . . . the primary
responsibility for looking after the interests of the funds’ shareholders.”46 
2. Regulation of the Advisory Contract 
The independent directors’ responsibility to mutual fund shareholders 
has marked relevance in the advisory contract approval context, as the
approval or renewal of any advisory contract requires a majority vote of 
a fund’s disinterested directors.47  As a baseline, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) 
specifies that the advisory contract must be in writing and must precisely
describe all compensation paid to the adviser under the contract.48 
Mutual fund boards of directors must request and evaluate any
information necessary to assess the terms of the advisory contract, and 
the investment adviser has a duty to furnish such relevant information.49 
Subsequent judicial interpretation confirms the status of these provisions
as more than mere formalities; shareholders may bring a federal claim 
alleging that a fund’s board has failed to comply with statutory 
procedures governing the advisory contract approval process.50 
3. Section 36(b) 
In the mid-1960s, responding to concerns stemming from the 
significant growth within the mutual fund industry, the SEC concluded 
that disinterested directors, mandated disclosure, and other procedural 
requirements could not adequately protect mutual fund shareholders 
from excessive advisory fees.51  Accordingly, Congress amended the
two fiscal years, have had a “material business or professional relationship” with the fund, its
principal executive officer, or other funds with the same investment adviser or principal 
executive officer.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A).
45. Id. § 80a-10(a); see also LOWENSTEIN, supra note 16, at 81, 169 (noting mutual
fund directors often do not stand for periodic reelection). 
46. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1979). 
47. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2006).  Although a mutual fund’s shareholders may 
annually approve the adviser’s contract, see id. § 80a-15(a)(2), “[i]n practice, the contract is
renewed by the directors, not the shareholders (which is a costly and cumbersome
alternative),” MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra note 29, § 6:2.2.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (2006). 
49. Id. § 80a-15(c). 
50. Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 420–21 (2d Cir. 1961).
51. SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. 
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Investment Company Act in 1970 to add section 36(b),52 which imposes 
a fiduciary duty on the investment advisers of SEC-registered
investment companies to protect mutual fund shareholders from fee 
gouging.53 
Put simply, section 36(b) forbids investment advisers from charging 
and collecting excessive investment advisory fees relative to the services
provided.54 As an enforcement mechanism, the statute grants fund 
shareholders an express private right of action against the investment
adviser.55  The plaintiff in a section 36(b) action bears the burden of
proving a breach of fiduciary duty.56  Although section 36(b) does not
provide specific standards for evaluating the size of the adviser’s fee, the
statute directs courts to defer to the investment company’s board’s
approval of the advisory contract to the extent that the circumstances
warrant.57  Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Gartenberg 
v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management aptly described section 36(b)’s 
legislative history as “tortuous,”58 one point is beyond dispute— 
Congress enacted the section out of concern regarding the conflicts of
interest inherent in mutual funds’ governance structure.59 
laws . . . [are] a less effective restraint on managerial compensation in this industry
than . . . in other industries. . . . [A]dditional regulatory provisions for advisory fees . . . 
which mainly require approval of advisory contracts by shareholders and unaffiliated
directors, have rarely operated to provide fund shareholders with an adequate share of 
the economies of size in many cases.”). 
52. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 
1413. 
53. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006). 
54. HAZEN, supra note 30, § 20.9. 
55. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b); see In re Nuveen Fund Litig., No. 94 C 360, 1996 WL
328006, at *13 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 1996) (“[Section] 36(b) provided shareholders with an
express cause of action against the investment adviser that by-passed demand on the 
directors.” (citing Daily Income Ins. Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 446 U.S. 523, 535 (1984))). 
56. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(1). 
57. Id. § 80a-35(b)(2). 
58. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 
1982).
59. See S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 2 (1969), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 
4898 (“[Y]our committee has adopted the basic principle that, in view of the potential
conflicts of interest involved in the setting of [advisory] fees, there should be effective 
means for the courts to act where mutual fund shareholders or the SEC believe there has 
























    
 
 





III. EVIDENCE OF EXCESSIVE FEES 
Nearly fifty years ago, Congress realized that investment advisers 
charged advisory fees disproportionate to the value of the services 
rendered.60  This section provides an overview of the evidence that led 
Congress to grant a private right of action to mutual fund investors 
affected by excessive advisory fees.  In addition, this section argues that 
mutual fund advisory fees remain excessive today, as evidenced by the 
disparity between mutual fund and pension fund advisory fees. 
In the early 1960s, investment company industry observers recognized
that mutual funds’ conflicted management structure created an 
opportunity for investment advisers to overreach with respect to their 
fees.61  In 1958, the SEC authorized the University of Pennsylvania’s 
Wharton School of Finance (Wharton School) to conduct a study of the
mutual fund market.62  At the SEC’s direction, the Wharton School
produced the influential Wharton Report—the most thorough analysis of 
the relationships among institutional actors in the mutual fund market of 
its time.63  Based on a questionnaire distributed to 163 investment
advisers with mutual fund clients, the Wharton Report found that, in
absolute terms, mutual fund investors paid higher advisory fees than the 
advisers’ other clients.64  The Wharton Report also observed that, despite
the likely emergence of economies of scale and lower per shareholder
costs as mutual fund assets increased, investment advisers failed to pass
on any such savings to shareholders.65  The Wharton Report posited that
conflicts of interest inherent in mutual funds’ governance structure—the 
close relationship between fund directors and investment advisers— 
distorted the normal operation of arm’s length negotiation and prevented
market forces from pressuring advisory fees down to the levels present
in the non-mutual fund context.66 
60. See  WHARTON SCH. OF FIN. & COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R.
REP. NO. 87-2274 (1962).
61. See id. 
62. SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. 
REP. NO. 89-2337, at 2–3 (1966). 
63. H.R. REP. NO. 87-2274, at v; see Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 103 
(describing the Wharton Report as “the first detailed and comprehensive study raising
questions about the reasonableness of mutual fund fees”).
64. H.R. REP. NO. 87-2274, at 430, 489.  The advisers’ other clients included all 
clients other than mutual funds, from small individual shareholder accounts to larger
accounts.  See id. at 481, 489. Nearly half of the advisers—twenty-four of fifty-four—
with both mutual fund and non-mutual fund clients charged their mutual fund clients two 
or more times as much as they did their non-mutual fund clients. Id. at 489. 
65. Id. at 28–29. 
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In 1966, the SEC largely adopted the Wharton Report’s conclusions, 
recommended that Congress amend the Investment Company Act to 
impose a standard of reasonableness on fees received by investment
advisers,67 and suggested a number of factors that Congress should take 
into account in evaluating advisory fee structures.68  In 1970, Congress
responded by enacting the aforementioned section 36(b), which imposed
a fiduciary duty on investment advisers as opposed to the reasonableness 
standard proposed by the SEC.69  Despite this legislative attempt to 
regulate advisory fees, the conditions that persisted in the 1960s— 
significant disparities between mutual fund and non-mutual fund 
advisory fees—continue today.
67. H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337, at 13.  The SEC Report actually recommended that the 
Investment Company Act be amended to provide that “[a]ll compensation received by
any person affiliated with a registered investment company . . . for services furnished to 
the investment company be reasonable.”  Id.  The SEC would have applied this limitation not
only to investment advisers’ compensation, but to directors’, trustees’, and underwriters’
compensation as well.  Id.  Ultimately, however, the 1970 amendments only imposed a
fiduciary duty on investment advisers.  See Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 36, 84 Stat. 1413, 1428–30. 
68. H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337, at 13.  The factors the SEC suggested included: 
[T]he fees paid for comparable services by other financial institutions engaged 
in administering pools of investment capital of like size and purpose . . . ; the 
nature and quality of the services provided; all benefits directly or indirectly
received by persons affiliated with an investment company . . . by virtue of 
their relationship with the investment company; and such competitive or other
factors as the Commission may . . . determine are appropriate and material in
the public interest . . . .
Id.
69. See S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 6 (1969), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 
4902 (“[Y]our committee has decided that there is an adequate basis to delete the express 
statutory requirement of ‘reasonableness,’ and to substitute a different method of testing
management compensation.  This bill states that the mutual fund investment adviser has 
a specific ‘fiduciary duty’ in respect to management fee compensation.”).  This change 
in section 36(b)’s language came as a result of objections to the proposed reasonableness 
language on the part of the mutual fund industry.  Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset
Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982).  Bills that would have amended the 
Investment Company Act to impose the SEC’s proposed reasonableness standard failed 
to win passage.  See S. 3724, 90th Cong. (1968); S. 1659, 90th Cong. (1967); H.R. 9511, 
90th Cong. (1967); H.R. 9510, 90th Cong. (1967).  Courts interpreting section 36(b)’s 
legislative history have read the rejection of these measures to imply that the version of
section 36(b) that Congress eventually enacted entailed something other than a review 
for reasonableness. See Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928 (“[T]he legislative history of 
[section] 36(b) indicates that the substitution of the term ‘fiduciary duty’ for ‘reasonable,’
while possibly intended to modify the standard somewhat, was a more semantical than
substantive compromise, shifting the focus slightly from the fund directors to
the conduct of the investment adviser-manager.”).
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A. Modern Evidence of Excessive Fees: 
The Mutual Fund-Pension Fund Dichotomy 
Legislative checks on advisory fees notwithstanding, mutual fund 
management fees and operating expenses grew 2400-fold in the period 
between 1950 and 2004, despite an only 1600-fold growth in mutual 
fund net assets.70  Perhaps the most striking evidence that mutual fund 
advisory fees remain excessive is the substantial discrepancy between
fees that investment advisers charge to pension fund clients71 and fees 
that those same advisers charge to mutual fund clients.72 
The advisory fees paid by the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (Calpers), one of the few pension funds to fully 
disclose what it pays its investment advisers, provide a useful example 
of this inequality.73  In 2002, Calpers paid three advisory firms an 
average of 0.08% of net assets to manage three portfolios of assets with
an average size of $720 million.74 During the same period, the same 
three advisory firms charged an average of 0.61% of net assets to
manage three mutual funds with similar portfolios and an average of $12
billion in net assets.75  Such disparities are commonplace,76 despite the
fact that one would expect the emergence of economies of scale to
render larger mutual funds actually less expensive to manage than 
smaller pension funds.77 
70. BOGLE, supra note 5, at 154–55. 
71. For ease of reference, this Comment generally refers to pension funds as an 
example of clients who pay lower advisory fees as a result of the ability to purchase
advisory fees on the free market in arm’s length transactions.  The same claim also applies to
other institutional investors, including “endowment funds, trusts, separate accounts, and 
even mutual funds that hire sub-advisers.”  Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 141. 
72. See, e.g., BOGLE, supra note 5, at 199–200; Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 
106–17; John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: The Cost of 
Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 627–36 (2001). 
73. BOGLE, supra note 5, at 199–200. 
74. Id. at 199. 
75. Id. 
76. For example, in 2002, the Alliance Premier Growth Fund paid its adviser and
sponsor Alliance Capital an advisory fee of $88 million—approximately 0.90% of the 
fund’s net assets (90 basis points).  Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 110–11. During the
same period, Alliance managed pension funds and other noncaptive funds for between
10 and 24 basis points. Id. at 111.  Alliance’s public disclosures indicated that the same
professionals managed both groups of funds according to similar investment strategies. 
Id. at 111–12. 
77. See, e.g., WHARTON SCH. OF FIN. & COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, 
H.R. REP. NO. 87-2274, at 492 (1962) (“[S]hareholders of open-end companies do not 
require individual portfolio attention, as other clients usually do, so that a single quarterly
compilation of portfolio holdings, for example, is all that is required for the aggregate of 
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Courts and commentators advance a number of theories to explain the 
gap between mutual fund and pension fund advisory fees.78  In section 
36(b) actions, plaintiffs commonly point to the difference between a 
challenged mutual fund advisory fee and pension fund advisory fees 
charged by the same investment adviser as prima facie evidence of the
mutual fund advisory fee’s unreasonableness.79  Perhaps the most 
common justification courts cite for summarily rejecting this comparison 
is the alleged “liquidity difference” between mutual funds and pension
funds—the claim that mutual funds cost more to manage because their
advisers must hold assets in more expensive, highly liquid investment
vehicles to facilitate frequent redemptions.80  However, this alleged 
liquidity difference is “something of a financial Loch Ness monster”— 
although it exists in theory, it has yet to be observed in practice.81  In 
fact, the Investment Company Institute, a mutual fund industry group,
has suggested that the true cost of providing management services to a 
mutual fund is comparable to the cost of providing management services 
companies suggests the greater likelihood of the emergence of economies of scale and 
lower costs with increases in asset size than where clients must be catered to on a more
individualized basis.”). 
78. See, e.g., Coates & Hubbard, supra note 19, at 185 (citing services investment
advisers must provide to mutual funds but not to pension funds). 
79. See, e.g., Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 04 C 8305, 2007 WL 627640, at *8 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2007) (“[Plaintiffs] insist that we must compare Harris’s fees not to
those charged to funds run by managers other than Harris but rather to those charged to 
institutional clients.”), aff’d, 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1579
(2009); Hunt v. Invesco Funds Group, Inc., No. H-04-02555, 2006 WL 1581846, at *3
(S.D. Tex. June 5, 2006); Strigliabotti v. Franklin Res., Inc., No. C 04-00883 SI, 2005 
WL 645529, at *34 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2005) (holding that plaintiff mutual fund
shareholders stated a claim under section 36(b) by demonstrating, inter alia, that the 
defendant-adviser charged a lower fee for similar services provided to a state pension
fund); Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 188 F. Supp. 2d 373, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Kalish v. 
Franklin Advisers, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1222, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).  But see Gallus v. 
Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816, 824 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Indeed, the argument for
comparing mutual fund advisory fees with the fees charged to institutional accounts is
particularly strong in this case because the investment advice may have been essentially
the same for both accounts.”). 
80. See, e.g., Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d at 634 (“Harris Associates charges a lower 
percentage of assets to other clients, but this does not imply that it must be charging too
much to the Oakmark funds.  Different clients call for different commitments of time. 
Pension funds have low (and predictable) turnover of assets.  Mutual funds may grow or
shrink quickly and must hold some assets in high-liquidity instruments to facilitate
redemptions.  That complicates an adviser’s task.”).
81. Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 115; see id. at 113–14 (“[T]his liquidity factor





















   
 
    
to a pension fund.82  Nevertheless, on average, mutual fund investors pay 
approximately twice as much for advisory services as do pension fund 
investors.83 
IV. CAUSES OF EXCESSIVE MUTUAL FUND ADVISORY FEES 
The disparity between mutual fund and pension fund advisory fees, 
and the more general problem of excessive mutual fund advisory fees, 
cannot be solved by pointing to a single discrete issue; rather, a 
confluence of factors has allowed investment advisers to charge fees to
their mutual fund clients representing several times what they charge to
their pension fund clients for essentially the same services.84  This Part 
discusses three aspects of the mutual fund industry and its regulation, 
and examines the adverse impact of these factors on mutual fund 
advisory fees.  Specifically, this Part demonstrates that an industry-wide
governance structure that impedes arm’s length negotiation between 
advisers and directors, a lack of price competition in the mutual fund 
market, and section 36(b)’s impotent shareholder remedy for excessive
fees allow investment advisers to charge advisory fees that a market free
of these characteristics would not allow. 
A. Mutual Funds’ Conflicted Governance Structure: 
A Failure To Negotiate 
Conflicts of interest inherent in most mutual funds’ governance 
structures have served to perpetuate excessive advisory fees.85  A typical 
mutual fund or mutual fund complex is established by an external 
82. See id. at 113–15 (citing Sean Collins, The Expenses of Defined Benefit 
Pension Plans and Mutual Funds, INVESTMENT COMPANY INST. PERSP., Dec. 2003, at 8,
http://www.ici.org/pdf/per09-06.pdf); see also Freeman & Brown, supra note 72, at 634
(“There is no evidence that managers of public pension fund equity portfolios are paid 
less than equity [mutual] fund managers because they do less work or perform at a lower
level.”).
83. See Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 106 (discussing a study that found that 
mutual fund managers received an advisory fee of 56 basis points, compared to pension 
fund managers’ 28 basis points, to manage mutual funds that averaged three times the 
size of their pension fund counterparts). 
84. See, e.g., BOGLE, supra note 5, at 199–200 (citing several possible explanations
for the disparity between mutual fund and pension fund advisory fees). 
85. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 5 (1969), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4897, 4901 (noting that, because of the unique structure of the investment adviser-mutual
fund relationship, the forces of arm’s length bargaining do not operate in the mutual fund 
industry in the same manner as in other sectors of the economy); see also Caroline J. 
Dillon, Do You Get What You Pay for? A Look at the High Fees and Low Protections of 
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investment management firm, which incorporates the fund, registers the 
fund with the SEC, appoints the fund’s initial board of directors, and 
serves as the fund’s initial investment adviser.86  The management firm
unilaterally determines how it will be compensated for these tasks.87 
The manager also contracts to provide the fund with investment 
advisory, marketing, and administrative services.88  Management firms 
tend not to relinquish their control of funds over time, and funds’
directors rarely—if ever—fire a manager in favor of another firm that 
can provide comparable investment advisory services more cheaply.89 
That this symbiotic investment adviser-mutual fund relationship 
redounds to the detriment of mutual fund shareholders in the form of 
increased advisory fees is an empirically demonstrable fact.90  Close ties
between mutual fund boards of directors and investment advisers 
correlate with higher advisory fees, induce boards to monitor advisers
less closely than they otherwise might, and negatively affect fund 
performance—at least marginally.91  Simply put, a mutual fund’s
86. Freeman & Brown, supra note 72, at 614–15. More often than not, the 
nominally disinterested directors appointed by the management firm also serve as
directors of other mutual funds administered by the management firm.  See, e.g., Krantz
v. Fid. Mgmt. & Research, Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d 150, 152 (D. Mass. 2000) (noting that
nine members of the twelve-member board of directors of Fidelity Management and 
Research Company’s (Fidelity) mutual fund complex also served on the boards of all 
237 mutual funds to which Fidelity provided investment advisory services). 
87. BOGLE, supra note 5, at 172 (“The management company operates the fund,
distributes its shares, and supervises and directs its investment portfolio.  It unilaterally
determines at the outset what fees it will charge.”).
88. Freeman & Brown, supra note 72, at 615. 
89. Id.; see, e.g., S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 5, as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4897, 4901. 
90. See Camelia M. Kuhnen, Business Networks, Corporate Governance and
Contracting in the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2185, 2219 (2009) (noting, however, 
that the overall economic effect of the adviser-board connections is small); 
Memorandum from Chester Spatt, Chief Economist, SEC, Office of Econ. Analysis 
(Dec. 29, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70304/oeamemo 122906-
litreview.pdf.
91. Kuhnen, supra note 90, at 2216. 
This discussion of the investment adviser-mutual fund conflict leaves aside another
negative consequence of the conflict—mutual fund directors’ failure to monitor 
investment advisers. This breakdown produced the late trading and market timing 
scandals that came to light in 2003, along with other wrongdoing.  See  HAZEN, supra
note 30, § 20.5 (discussing late trading and market timing scandals); see also  BOGLE, 
supra note 5, at 145–47 (discussing examples of abusive mutual fund trading practices). 
These scandals had the immediate effect of transferring wealth out of the hands of 





























    
independent directors do not negotiate with the investment adviser at
arm’s length on behalf of the fund, leading to high advisory fees—and
high profit margins—for the investment adviser.92  The disparity 
between mutual fund advisory fees and pension fund advisory fees 
provides ample evidence of this fact.93  As discussed in greater detail 
above, investment advisers charge pension funds approximately half of 
what they charge mutual funds for comparable advisory services.94  This
discrepancy results, at least in part, from the simple fact that pension 
funds purchase advisory services in arm’s length transactions on the free 
market, whereas mutual funds effectively have no choice but to contract
with their adviser-manager.95 
One of the most egregious examples of wrongdoing—which fund managers likely
could have averted through judicious oversight—involved the purchase by Alfred Harrison, a
mutual fund manager with Alliance Capital Management (Alliance), of almost 43 million
shares of Enron stock, including greater than $120 million in purchases in the months 
leading up to firm’s downfall.  See Benak ex rel. Alliance Premier Growth Fund v.
Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., 435 F.3d 396, 398–99 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[I]n October and 
November 2001, as the reports of Enron’s worsening financial state increased, appellees 
continued to invest in the company.”).  In exchange for Harrison and Alliance’s advice—
which led to a $5 billion decrease in net assets for the fiscal year that ended November
30, 2001—the Alliance Premier Growth Fund paid a $135 million advisory fee.  Alliance 
Premier Growth Fund, Inc., Annual Report (Form N-30D), at 13–14 (Nov. 30, 2001). 
Although the Alliance Premier Growth Fund was not the only mutual fund to feel the 
sting of Enron’s collapse, it had the dubious distinction of being the only fund to share a 
common director—Frank Savage—with the failed energy conglomerate.  Reed Abelson
& Kenneth N. Gilpin, 2 Enron Roles Raise Questions of Allegiance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 
2001, at C1.  The Third Circuit ultimately dismissed a shareholder derivative suit against
Alliance as untimely.  Benak, 435 F.3d at 403. However, many shareholders and industry
observers raised questions regarding the propriety of Savage’s apparent conflict of 
interest.  See Abelson & Gilpin, supra. 
92. See  BOGLE, supra note 5, at 172–73; Freeman & Brown, supra note 72, at 
617–18. 
93. See Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 141–42. 
94. See supra notes 70–83 and accompanying text. 
95. See Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 140–41 (“Because the [mutual] fund market
features prices drawn from negotiation where one party (the fund) is under compulsion
to buy from only one supplier (the adviser), mutual fund fees negotiated between captive 
funds and their adviser, whether considered individually or collectively, cannot reflect 
fair market value . . . .”).  Thus, the investment adviser-mutual fund relationship is 
analogous to a bilateral monopoly—a market in which there exists only one buyer and
one seller. Scott R. Peppet, Contract Formation in Imperfect Markets: Should We Use 
Mediators in Deals?, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 283, 302 (2004). Bilateral 
monopolies favor the party who possesses greater bargaining power, and the party who is 
most able to impose costs on the other side—while simultaneously absorbing costs 
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B. Competition in the Mutual Fund Market
Closely related to mutual funds’ conflicted governance structure is the 
fact that ordinary forces of market competition have failed to protect 
mutual fund shareholders from excessive advisory fees.96  Contrary to
Judge Easterbrook’s reasoning in Harris Associates, as well as the 
assertions of mutual fund trade groups, the mutual fund market simply 
does not exhibit the vigorous price competition necessary to drive down 
advisory fees to levels near their fair market value.97  According to a
recent study conducted by the American Enterprise Institute, the mutual
fund industry exhibits a low degree of concentration and “should be one 
of the most competitive [industries] in the country.”98  Barriers to new 
firm entry are low, and mutual fund investors can—and do—move from 
fund to fund without incurring significant transactions costs.99  Yet, a  
review of mutual fund advisory fees demonstrates that substantial price 
dispersion exists despite a general lack of differentiation among products
and services.100 
In a truly competitive market, absent significant differentiation among
available products, one would expect prices for advisory services to
group more tightly around the mean because advisers could not charge 
advisory fees markedly higher than the marginal cost of providing 
portfolio management services.101  Commentators have suggested that 
advisory fees remain high despite other hallmarks of competition
because the mutual fund market allows fund managers to compete 
aggressively for new sales while simultaneously sheltering extraordinarily 
96. See Dillon, supra note 85, at 308 (“Market mechanisms, though reliable for 
regulation of prices in many other contexts, are not a reasonable alternative for the
regulation of mutual fund fees because conflicts of interest between the board of 
directors and the investment adviser prevent true arm’s length negotiations.”).
97. See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 634 (7th Cir. 2008) (arguing
that mutual funds compete on price and that the mutual fund market displays hallmarks 
of atomistic competition), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1579 (2009); INV. CO. INST., supra
note 1, at 61 (“[M]utual fund fees have been pushed down by . . . competition within the 
mutual fund industry.”). 
98. WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 5, at 48 (observing that the mutual fund 
industry’s Herfindahl-Hirschman index—the measure of industry concentration favored 
by federal antitrust regulators—stands at 400, well within the “unconcentrated” category). 
99. Id. at 48–49; Coates & Hubbard, supra note 19, at 167–70.















   
    














profitable advisory fee levels from price-cutting pressures.102  Moreover,
certain agency costs tend to hinder competition, belying the conclusion
that low transactions costs allow investors to fire an investment adviser 
at will by moving their investment to a competing fund with a more 
attractive fee structure.103 
C. The Current State of Section 36(b) Litigation
Recognizing that mutual funds’ conflicted governance structure 
obstructed the forces of arm’s length bargaining between mutual funds 
and their investment advisers,104 in 1970, Congress amended the
Investment Company Act to add section 36(b).105  Before section 36(b)’s
inclusion in the Act, a shareholder could challenge an investment 
adviser’s fee only by alleging corporate waste.106  The waste standard 
required plaintiffs to show that the adviser’s services were of such 
inadequate value that no person of ordinary, sound business judgment 
would deem them worth what the mutual fund paid.107 Congress 
102. See Freeman & Brown, supra note 72, at 655. 
103. Memorandum from Chester Spatt, supra note 90, at 9–10. These agency costs 
include tax disadvantages inherent in the sale of appreciated mutual fund shares and the 
fact that shareholders’ choices are often limited to those mutual funds included in their
employers’ retirement plans.  Id.  With regard to tax implications, “[i]t has generally
been shown that investors are reluctant to sell securities that have appreciated 
significantly in the past. . . . As tax appreciation increases, along with the expected tax
burden upon sale, investors are less likely to sell today even if they receive bad news 
about managers.”  Id. In essence, economically rational investors will not 
withdraw their investments from poorly managed funds with significant capital gains
tax liabilities unless they expect the benefit from an alternative investment to outweigh 
the tax disadvantages inherent in the sale of appreciated securities.  One might
reasonably expect investors’ lack of knowledge regarding the quality of fund
management and the difficulty of predicting mutual fund returns to compound these 
agency costs because investors cannot accurately predict the value of alternative mutual
fund investments. See id. at 9 (“[A]cademic studies find that Morningstar’s rankings are 
poor predictors of future performance for all but the lowest rated funds.  Investors’ lack 
of knowledge about the quality of fund management may also make them less likely to 
withdraw assets from poorly managed funds.”).
104. See S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 5 (1969), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 
4901. 
105. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 
1413. 
106. MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra note 29, § 7:2.1; see S. REP. NO. 91-184, at
5, as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4901 (“[A]dvisory contracts which are 
ratified by the shareholders . . . may not be upset in the courts except upon a showing of
‘corporate waste.’”).
107. See Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 611 (Del. Ch. 1962) (“It is plaintiffs’ 
contention that in each of the years after 1954, the dollar amount of the annual fee was so
large that it bore no reasonable relation to the value of the advisory services then being
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explicitly rejected this standard in enacting section 36(b), declaring it 
“unduly restrictive.”108  Ultimately, however, the judicial interpretations
of section 36(b) improve little on the waste standard that Congress 
sought to supplant.109 
Following the adoption of section 36(b), courts faced with excessive
fee lawsuits consistently held that the statute incorporated the common
law concept of fiduciary duty.110  This standard implied rigorous scrutiny 
for fairness, limiting an adviser’s fee to what could be considered fair 
under “traditional equitable standards.”111 To prevail, plaintiff shareholders
bore the burden of demonstrating that the advisory contract was 
somehow unfair to the company and its shareholders.112  Given the 
amorphous nature of this fairness review, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals saw fit to delineate a clear standard for evaluating section 36(b) 
claims.113 
1. Gartenberg: A Flawed Framework 
In 1980, individual shareholders Irving Gartenberg and Simone Andre 
brought suit against Merrill Lynch Asset Management (Merrill Lynch)— 
adviser to the money market fund Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust (the
judgment would deem the services worth what Fund had paid for them.”); see also 
MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra note 29, § 7:2.1 (“Under this standard, shareholders 
were required to show that the fee was ‘unconscionable’ or ‘shocking.’” (citing Acampora v.
Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963))).  Conversely, “all the defendant needed to
show was that ‘any reasonable person might conclude that the deal made
sense.’”  Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 125 (quoting Steiner v. Meyerson, Civ. A. No. 
13139, 1999 WL 441999, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995)). 
108. S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 5, as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4901. 
109. See Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 139 (2008) (“[T]he federal fiduciary
standard applied in section 36(b) cases under Gartenberg is an infirm and warped legal 
standard . . . . It is not an improvement on the common law of waste standard.”). 
110. Angelo G. Savino, Note, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees—Too Much for Too
Little?, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 530, 543–44 & nn.115–16 (1980) (collecting cases). 
111. Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807, 812 n.12 (2d Cir. 1976). 
112. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1038, 1047
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“[T]he Court must consider the ‘nature, quality and extent’ of the 
services [provided] to the Fund in relation to the fee paid by the Fund.”), aff’d, 694 F.2d 
923 (2d. Cir. 1982). Mere demonstration that “a better bargain was possible” did not
establish that the advisory contract was unfair. Id.
113. See Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928 (noting that the Congress that enacted section




















     









Fund)—under section 36(b).114  The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that, although Merrill Lynch’s
advisory fee was irrefutably high in the abstract, the plaintiffs failed to 
show that it bore anything other than a reasonable relationship to the
services Merrill Lynch had provided.115  Noting that the Fund’s trustees 
analyzed a substantial amount of documentary material and engaged in 
significant deliberations before approving the advisory contract, the 
court concluded that the totality of the circumstances compelled a 
finding in Merrill Lynch’s favor.116 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal, enunciating the standard that courts applied in section 36(b)
actions for the next twenty-five years.117  Seizing upon language in
section 36(b)’s legislative history, the court concluded that arm’s length 
bargaining did not occur in the market for mutual fund advisory
contracts.118  Thus, the court held that the test of whether an adviser’s fee 
violated his section 36(b) fiduciary duty “[was] essentially whether the 
fee schedule represent[ed] a charge within the range of what would have
been negotiated at arm’s-length in light of all of the surrounding
circumstances.”119  The court listed six factors to consider in evaluating 
an allegedly excessive fee, including “[1] the nature and quality of 
services provided to fund shareholders; [2] the profitability of the fund 
to the adviser-manager; [3] fall-out benefits; [4] economies of scale;
114. Gartenberg, 528 F. Supp. at 1040. At the time, the Fund’s net assets exceeded
$19 billion. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 927. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1981,
Merrill Lynch took an advisory fee of over $39 million, id. at 931, which constituted
0.288% of the Fund’s average daily net assets, Gartenberg, 528 F. Supp. at 1040.
Merrill Lynch’s fee structure contained breakpoints, scaling the advisory fee downward
as net assets increased. Id. at 1043.  Accordingly, Merrill Lynch’s fee ranged from 0.50% of
assets not exceeding $500 million to 0.275% of assets exceeding $2.5 billion. Id.  As  
noted by the court, 0.288% of the fund’s net assets represents the “effective rate” of the 
fee when the scale is applied to the Fund’s total average daily net assets. Id. 
115. Gartenberg, 528 F. Supp. at 1068.  The court noted that the Fund’s explosive 
growth had required Merrill Lynch to provide costlier facilities and had increased the 
cost of processing redemption orders. Id.
The district court also gave significant weight to the structure of the fund, which
allowed shareholders to “terminate the relationship simply by writing a check and 
redeeming at once.”  Id. at 1067.  For an argument that low-cost redemption of mutual 
fund shares provides a check on advisory fees by facilitating competition in the mutual
fund industry, see Coates & Hubbard, supra note 19, at 162. 
116. Gartenberg, 528 F. Supp. at 1064, 1068. 
117. See, e.g., Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 
2001); Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 875 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1989); Gallus v. 
Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 974 (D. Minn. 2007), rev’d, 561 F.3d 816 (8th 
Cir. 2009). 
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[5] comparative fee structures; and [6] the independence and 
conscientiousness of the trustees.”120  Upon considering these factors,
the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of 
establishing a breach of fiduciary duty.121 
2. Criticism of Gartenberg 
In recent years, commentators and courts alike have criticized the
Gartenberg standard for excessive fee litigation. Commentators have 
argued that courts manipulate the Gartenberg factors in such a way as to 
effectively prevent recovery by plaintiff shareholders without ever 
creating liability on the part of the defendant advisers, thus establishing 
an insurmountable burden for section 36(b) plaintiffs.122 
For example, one of the Gartenberg factors requires courts to examine
the nature and quality of the services provided by the adviser in 
evaluating the size of the advisory fee.123  Courts often equate above
average yields with high quality advisory services, and if a fund has 
enjoyed above average yields, courts weigh the nature and quality of the 
services provided as a factor in upholding the challenged advisory fee.124 
The converse, however, does not hold true if a fund has suffered below 
average returns.125 
120. Krinsk, 875 F.2d at 409 (citing Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 929–30). 
121. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 933.  The court also summarily rejected the plaintiffs’ 
argument that the court should consider the lower fees that Merrill Lynch had charged to 
administer pension funds as a criterion in evaluating mutual fund advisory fees.  Id. at
930 n.3. Plaintiffs commonly make this argument in section 36(b) actions, to no avail. 
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 79. 
122. See Dillon, supra note 85, at 294–303 (discussing courts’ manipulation of
Gartenberg factors in investment advisers’ favor); Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 139 
(“[T]he federal fiduciary standard applied in section 36(b) cases under Gartenberg is an 
infirm and warped legal standard requiring scrutiny of hidden or essentially
undiscoverable data that, even if found, are subject to wildly different interpretations by
well paid and highly-credentialed experts.”).
123. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 930; accord Krinsk, 875 F.2d at 409. 
124. See Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 472, 488–89 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988) (noting that fund enjoyed superior yields relative to other funds and suggesting
that such yields resulted from adviser’s research and trading strategies), aff’d, 875 F.2d 
404 (2d Cir. 1989). 
125. See Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 327–28 (4th Cir. 
2001) (refusing to permit discovery in section 36(b) action when plaintiffs alleged that 































In Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming International, plaintiffs in a section 
36(b) action alleged that the investment adviser’s fee was excessive in 
relation to the mutual fund’s deficient performance.126  Granting the
investment adviser’s motion to dismiss, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals refused to accept the plaintiffs’ argument that investment
advisory services resulting in below average yields necessarily had less 
value than similar services provided to a better performing fund.127 
Although the court did not hold that underperformance had no relevance 
in evaluating the size of the advisory fee, it noted that investors assumed
some risk that their investments would not perform up to expectations.128 
Comparing the Fourth Circuit’s treatment of the nature-and-quality-of-
services factor in the context of an underperforming fund to other courts’ 
treatment of the same factor in the context of a higher yielding fund, it 
becomes clear that the Gartenberg factors allow for significant judicial 
manipulation—a court can minimize the importance of those factors that
would appear to weigh against the investment adviser in order to reach
the court’s desired result.129 
126. Id. at 327. 
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals worried that allowing the plaintiffs to
proceed to discovery upon a mere showing of underperformance would “make it possible 
for other plaintiffs to state a claim in limitless actions filed under Section 36(b).” Id. at 
328. Although the court’s concern was undeniably well founded in relation to actions in 
which the plaintiff only submitted evidence of a fund’s deficient performance, a court 
could easily apply the same analysis to a case in which the plaintiff also submitted
evidence on other Gartenberg factors. 
Commentators have criticized other Gartenberg factors as incapable of reliable judicial
measurement.  See Dillon, supra note 85, at 296–97 (discussing the “profitability to
adviser” and “fall-out benefits” factors); see also WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 5, at 77 
(“[T]he only objectively quantifiable elements in [the Gartenberg analysis] are the 
adviser’s cost and the volume of orders.  Because order processing does not involve a 
significant cost, and the other elements of the test are either hard to evaluate or discover, 
or of little significance when discovered, the directors will naturally focus on the 
adviser’s costs.”). For example, in calculating the net profits to the Fund, the court in 
Gartenberg arrived at three estimates of after-tax profits ranging from $15,133,149 to 
–$7,739,391.  Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 931 n.4 (2d Cir. 
1982).  With a $22 million dollar disparity in its estimates, the court could not 
reasonably rely on profitability to hold that Merrill Lynch had charged the Fund
excessive advisory fees. Id. at 931.  Compounding the problem, mutual funds jealously
guard data that would allow plaintiffs to accurately calculate profitability.  Freeman et 
al., supra note 3, at 131 (“Profitability is difficult to calculate, for starters, because it is 
tough to obtain the raw data necessary to make the calculations. . . . To even start a 
profitability analysis, a plaintiff must marshal evidence the SEC itself does not have and
says it cannot obtain.”).
Similarly, courts have struggled to measure the fallout benefits—intrinsic benefits 
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3. Jones v. Harris Associates: Worse for Plaintiffs 
One court has rejected the Gartenberg approach, but its reasoning 
suggests that it did not do so out of concern that the Gartenberg standard 
placed an undue burden on plaintiffs.  In August 2004, three individual 
plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Harris Associates (Harris), investment 
adviser to the Oakmark family of mutual funds, alleging that Harris 
received an advisory fee so disproportionate to the value of the services
it had provided as to constitute a breach of its section 36(b) fiduciary
duty.130  Ruling on cross motions for summary judgment, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois considered the 
Gartenberg factors and concluded that Harris’s advisory fee fell within 
an acceptable range.131 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court’s ultimate conclusion, albeit on different grounds.132  In an opinion
written by notable law and economics scholar Judge Frank Easterbrook,133 
the court rejected the Gartenberg approach to section 36(b) litigation.134 
The court concluded—contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument—that the
Gartenberg standard relied too little on the role of markets in regulating 
mutual fund. See Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 740 F.2d 190, 193 (2d 
Cir. 1984) (“Peat, Marwick Mitchell and Co. . . . concluded after a careful study that 
[‘fall-out’ commission] benefits could not be reliably quantified and that an attempt to do
so would be prohibitively expensive.”).  But see Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 497 F.
Supp. 2d 974, 981 (D. Minn. 2007) (noting that defendant investment adviser disclosed 
fallout benefits accruing to the adviser to the mutual fund’s board of directors during the 
fee negotiation process), rev’d, 561 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 2009). 
130. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 04 C 8305, 2007 WL 627640, at *1–3 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 27, 2007), aff’d, 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1579 
(2009).
131. The district court noted that four factors compelled a finding in Harris’s favor: 
(1) Harris charged funds comparable to those charged by similar funds managed by other
companies; (2) Harris disclosed all relevant information to the Funds’ trustees, who in
turn approved Harris’s fee; (3) the Funds’ fee schedule contained breakpoints resulting 
from the trustees’ negotiation efforts; and (4) the Funds performed well during the 
damages period. Id. at *8. 
132. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627 (affirming district court’s decision and
disapproving Gartenberg approach to section 36(b) litigation). 
133. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court
Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 40–61 
(2004) (noting Judge Easterbrook’s status as one of the most productive and widely cited 
circuit judges). 





















   






















advisory fees.135  Noting that the mutual fund market has grown 
significantly since the 1970 Amendments,136 Judge Easterbrook posited
that the size and structure of the mutual fund market facilitate 
competition, thus driving down the price of investment advisory
services.137  Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined to
review Harris’s advisory fee and held that the responsibility to regulate 
advisory fees belonged to “[t]he trustees (and in the end investors, who 
vote with their feet and dollars), rather than a judge or jury.”138 
The Seventh Circuit’s Harris Associates decision promises to make
shareholder recovery of excessive advisory fees under section 36(b) 
even less likely.139  Although some commentators have argued that the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals simply articulated the Gartenberg
standard differently,140 others contend that the Harris Associates
approach will provide even greater protection to mutual fund advisers 
who charge fees comparable to those charged by other advisers in the
market.141  Judge Richard Posner, dissenting from the Seventh Circuit’s
135. Id.
136. Id. at 633 (“Section 36(b) does not create a rate-regulation mechanism, and 
plaintiffs’ proposal to create such a mechanism in 2008 cannot be justified by suppositions 
about the market conditions of 1970. A lot has happened in the last 38 years.”).  Between
World War II and 2002, a market of less than 100 mutual funds holding just over $1
billion in assets became a market of over 8000 mutual funds holding $6 trillion in assets.
Id. at 633–34 (citing Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 
J. ECON. PERSP. 161, 161 (2004)). In fact, the assets of United States mutual funds have
almost doubled since 2002. INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 7 (“[U.S.-registered
investment companies] managed more than $10 trillion in assets at the end of 2008 for
93 million investors.”).
137. Seizing on the argument that freely redeemable shares facilitate competition,
Judge Easterbrook suggested that, even if sparse competition for mutual fund advisory
contracts fails to regulate advisory fees, shareholders’ ability to cheaply and easily move 
their money to another fund charging lower fees creates an incentive for investment
advisors to keep their rates competitively low.  See Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d at 633–34
(citing Coates & Hubbard, supra note 19, at 151). 
138. Id. at 632. However, the court did not rule out the possibility that the sheer 
size of an adviser’s fee, relative to fees charged by competitors for similar services,
might constitute prima facie evidence of a section 36(b) violation. Id. (“It is possible to
imagine compensation so unusual that a court will infer that deceit must have occurred . . . for
example, if a university’s board of trustees decides to pay the president $50 million a
year, when no other president of a comparable institution receives more than $2 million . . . .”).
139. See Floyd Norris, Fund Fees Revisited in Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at 
C1 (“Anyone who finds [fund] fees unreasonably high . . . now has a much smaller 
chance of getting the courts to intervene.”).
140. See Lee Anne Copenhefer et al., Seventh Circuit “Disapproves” Gartenberg, 
but Is This New Approach Fundamentally Different? (May 27, 2008), http://www.
bingham.com/media.aspx?mediaID=7004 (“At the end of the day, the Harris Associates
decision articulates a standard that does not appear to be that different from the
Gartenberg standard.”); see also Martin & Lybecker, supra note 7.
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denial of the Harris Associates plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing en banc,
expressed concern that, given the conflicts of interest inherent in mutual
funds’ governance structure, a comparability approach to section 36(b)
litigation might actually perpetuate inflated advisory fees.142 
On March 9, 2009, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in Harris Associates.143  The petitioners—plaintiffs below—presented 
the question as “[w]hether the [Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals] 
erroneously held . . . that a shareholder’s claim that the fund’s investment
adviser charged an excessive fee . . . is not cognizable under [section]
36(b), unless the shareholder can show that the adviser misled the fund’s
director who approved the fee.”144  In opposition to certiorari, the
respondent—Harris Associates—contended, inter alia, that the approach
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had adopted substantially mirrored
the Gartenberg standard.145  Although commentators expect the
Supreme Court to provide mutual funds’ boards of directors with
guidance regarding how to negotiate fairer fees,146 this Comment posits
that a structural remedy would best serve to vitiate the conflicts inherent
in mutual funds’ governance structure and foster more efficient 
competition among mutual funds.147 
V. A SOLUTION TO THE EXCESSIVE ADVISORY FEE PUZZLE:
DEFAULT RULES 
Market forces have largely failed to protect mutual fund shareholders 
from excessive advisory fees,148 and Congress’s attempt to remedy the
142. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., 
dissenting) (“The governance structure that enables mutual fund advisers to charge
exorbitant fees is industry-wide, so the panel’s comparability approach would if widely
followed allow those fees to become the industry’s floor.”), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 
1579 (2009); see also Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 128 (“Evaluating no-bid contract 
prices against other no-bid contract prices is futile.”).
143. Harris Assocs., 129 S. Ct. at 1580. 
144. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 08-586
(U.S. Nov. 3, 2008). 
145. See Brief in Opposition at 14–21, Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 08-586 
(U.S. Feb. 2, 2009). 
146. E.g., Jason Zweig, Can the Supreme Court Undress High Fund Fees?, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 15, 2009, at B1. 
147. See supra Part IV.A–C; infra Part V. 
















   
  




    
 
problem through section 36(b) has proved ineffective.149  Given  that  
mutual funds’ management structure lies at the root of these problems,150 
this Comment proposes that Congress and the Commission implement a 
system of default rules aimed at fostering more efficient negotiations
between investment advisers and mutual funds’ independent directors, as 
well as promoting price competition in the mutual fund industry.
A. Benchmarking Fees: A Penalty Default To Make 
Advisers Negotiate 
In order to remedy the conflicts of interest inherent in mutual funds’ 
governance structure, this Comment proposes that the SEC use its 
rulemaking authority to impose a default advisory fee level and to
require investment advisers to reach a negotiated level of advisory fees 
with directors in order to opt out of the default.151  By setting the default
advisory fee level near the low end of the market, the Commission can 
successfully remedy the disparity in bargaining power that exists
between the investment adviser and the mutual fund’s board of directors 
and produce advisory fee structures more in line with the fair market
value of advisory services.152 
1. A General Theory of Penalty Defaults 
In 1989, Professors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner published a highly
influential article on the role of default rules as they pertained to 
incomplete contracts.153  Prior to Ayres and Gertner’s article, commentators
largely theorized that legislatures should fill gaps in incomplete 
contracts with “majoritarian” default terms approximating what the 
parties would have agreed upon given the opportunity to negotiate.154 In 
149. See supra Part IV.C. 
150. See supra Part IV.A. 
151. The SEC has authority to “issue . . . rules and regulations and such orders as are
necessary or appropriate to the exercise of the powers conferred upon the Commission” 
under the Investment Company Act.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-37(a) (2006).  Congress granted
the SEC broad authority to enforce the provisions of the Act. See id. § 80a-41; see also
id. § 80a-35(b) (conferring authority on the Commission to enforce section 36(b)’s
fiduciary duty). 
152. See Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 140–41 (arguing that advisory fees 
negotiated between investment advisers and their captive mutual funds do not reflect the 
fair market value of advisory services).
153. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
154. See id. at 89–90, 93 (“Few academics have gone beyond one-sentence theories
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contrast, Ayres and Gertner proposed that efficient default rules might 
actually take the form of outcomes that the parties would not have 
agreed upon, thereby inducing the parties to affirmatively contract for 
the terms that they would prefer.155 
Ayres and Gertner posited that penalty default rules could lead to 
more efficient contracting as a result of several mechanisms.156  First and 
foremost, penalty default rules give at least one party an incentive to 
explicitly avoid the default outcome by contracting around the default 
rule—the party against whom a penalty default rule is set must reach an
agreement with the party in whose favor the penalty default rule 
operates, or the default outcome prevails.157  Second, by inducing parties
to contract around the default, penalty default rules encourage the more
informed contracting party to reveal information to the less informed
party, especially if the incentive is on the more informed party to 
contract around the default.158  Finally, by requiring parties to take
affirmative procedural steps in order to opt out of the default outcome, 
legislatures can encourage the parties—especially the relatively uninformed
party—to reflect on the consequences of entering into the contract before
doing so.159 
In recent years, commentators have adapted Ayres and Gertner’s 
theory of penalty default rules to regulatory regimes, arguing that certain
regulations act as “regulatory penalty defaults” by imposing undesirable 
outcomes on the regulated entity unless the default produces an 
While this literature has vigorously examined what particular parties would have contracted 
for in particular contractual settings, it has failed to question whether the ‘would have 
wanted’ standard is conceptually sound.”). 
155. Id. at 91. 
156. See id. at 97–100. 
157. Id. at 97.  By forcing ex ante bargaining, legislatures may prevent contracting 
parties from imposing costs on third parties by leaving the terms of a contract to ex post
determination by a court. Id. at 93. 
158. Id. at 97–98.  By promoting the production of information that the relatively
informed party might otherwise conceal, penalty default rules maximize the value
created by the contract and minimize the opportunity for the relatively informed party to 
engage in rent-seeking behavior.  See id. at 99–100. Although it would seem to defy
rationality to suggest that a relatively informed party would withhold information that 
would increase the value created by the contract, this leaves aside the possibility that by
revealing information the relatively informed party might simultaneously increase the
value created by the contract and decrease the relatively informed party’s share of that value.
See id.

















      













alternative outcome acceptable to the regulator.160  Like penalty defaults
in contract law, regulatory penalty defaults can force the regulated entity
to produce privately held information, or information that the regulated
entity is best situated to obtain, in order to propose an acceptable 
alternative outcome.161  Moreover, regulatory penalty defaults that take
effect at a future date force the regulated entity to propose an acceptable
alternative outcome in order to avoid the effect of the undesirable 
default.162  By opting for a regulatory penalty default, rather than a
mandatory prescriptive rule, legislatures can encourage collaboration
between the regulated entity and the regulator in order to achieve 
mutually desirable outcomes.163 
2. Applying Penalty Defaults to Mutual Fund 
Advisory Contracts 
This Comment posits that the rationale motivating the application of 
penalty default rules in both contract law and regulation apply equally 
strongly to the mutual fund-investment adviser relationship.  First and 
foremost, a penalty default rule set against investment advisers will force
advisers to actually negotiate with mutual funds’ independent directors 
in order to avoid an undesirably low fee schedule.164  Second, by
requiring investment advisers to negotiate with mutual funds’ 
independent directors, a penalty default rule will compel investment
advisers to disclose fee-related information that, to this point, advisers
have largely concealed.165 
160. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 869 (2006) (“Regulated entities have the option to avoid
compliance with these rules by ‘voluntarily’ undertaking a self-initiated alternative course of
action that under specified conditions may be a satisfactory substitute for the otherwise 
applicable rule.”); see also IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 108–09 (1992).
161. Karkkainen, supra note 160, at 869. 
162. Id. at 869–70. 
163. Id. at 901–02.  An example of a regulatory penalty default regime in the 
environmental law context is California’s Proposition 65, which allows polluters to opt
out of potential civil liability by producing information necessary to establish regulatory
standards and cooperating with regulators to reduce toxic emissions.  Id. at 871–75; see
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5–.13 (West 2006). 
164. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 153, at 98 (arguing that, in the context of 
incomplete contracting, a penalty default price term set against the seller encourages the
seller to negotiate to fill any price gaps).
165. See Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 131 (noting that investment advisory firms 
generally refuse to produce data regarding the cost of providing services to mutual funds,
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By forcing an investment adviser to reach a negotiated fee structure
with a mutual fund’s independent directors, a penalty default rule set 
against the investment adviser will result in the type of arm’s length
bargaining that has remained largely nonexistent in the majority of 
mutual fund boardrooms.166  As discussed in greater detail above,167 the 
significant disparity between mutual fund advisory fees and pension 
fund advisory fees stems in large part from the fact that pension funds 
have the ability to purchase advisory services in arm’s length exchanges 
in the free market.168  In contrast, mutual funds’ conflicted governance 
structure has effectively allowed investment advisers to unilaterally set
their own compensation.169  By virtue of its sheer undesirability, a
statutorily mandated or a rule-mandated low level of advisory fee 
approximating a penalty default rule will give the investment adviser no 
choice but to come to the bargaining table and negotiate with the mutual 
fund’s independent directors in order to avoid the default outcome.170 
Moreover, by putting the investment adviser at an immediate 
disadvantage relative to the mutual fund’s board of directors, a penalty
default rule increases the likelihood that the adviser will offer 
166. See id. at 140–41 (arguing that the disparity between mutual fund and pension
fund advisory fees results from a general lack of arm’s length bargaining); cf. Charles F. 
Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1067 n.154 (2004) (arguing that destabilization rights, a 
concept based in part on Ayres and Gertner’s theory of penalty defaults, can force 
negotiation between parties that might be otherwise reluctant to do so).
167. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
168. See Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 141.  The fact that many pension fund
advisers are compensated according to incentive fee structures, through which they
receive increased compensation only if the fund performs well, provides further evidence 
of the fact that pension fund advisory fees are negotiated at arm’s length.  See BOGLE, 
supra note 5, at 200. This type of fee structure is largely unheard of in mutual fund
management arrangements. Id.
 169. BOGLE, supra note 5, at 172–73. 
170. Penalty defaults give the party or parties against whose interests the default is
set an incentive to bargain around the default.  Ayres & Gertner, supra note 153, at 97; 
see also Karkkainen, supra note 160, at 902. 
In this same vein, a penalty default set against the investment adviser will also have an 
action-inducing character. See Karkkainen, supra note 160, at 869–70.  A mutual fund’s 
board of directors or shareholders must reapprove the investment adviser’s contract 
yearly.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(2) (2006).  Thus, if the investment adviser fails to propose
an alternative fee structure amenable to the mutual fund’s board of directors by the time 


























    
  
concessions with regard to its fee structure in exchange for an escape
from the unwanted default outcome. 
As a consequence of its negotiation-inducing character, a penalty 
default rule set against the investment adviser will also trigger the 
production of fee-related information that the adviser might otherwise 
withhold.171  Although the Investment Company Act requires investment
advisers to furnish independent directors with whatever information they
need to evaluate the terms of a proposed advisory contract,172 advisers 
have historically been reluctant to share raw data pertaining to the costs 
of servicing mutual funds.173  Without this data, it is nearly impossible
for independent directors to determine a fee schedule that allows the
investment adviser to realize a reasonable profit, while simultaneously 
reserving a fair share of gains to shareholders.174  However, under a
penalty default regime, investment advisers would have no choice but to 
reveal this data in order to avoid the undesirable outcome.175  Like a  
regulatory penalty default, setting the advisory fee default at a level
potentially unprofitable to the investment adviser would force the 
adviser to reveal profitability and other data to the mutual fund’s 
independent directors in order to secure approval for its alternative fee
schedule.176  The Commission can further ensure that the adviser 
produces this information by delineating specific procedures for
contracting around the default—the Commission might require the 
adviser or independent directors to explain to shareholders the basis for 
any departure from the default.177  If the adviser refuses to produce this
data, the unpalatable penalty default level of advisory fees will control, 
resulting in a windfall to the mutual fund at the adviser’s expense.178 
171. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 153, at 97 (“The very process of ‘contracting 
around’ [a penalty default] can reveal information to parties inside or outside the contract.”). 
172. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2006). 
173. Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 131. Even the SEC has been unable to obtain
this data. Id.
174. See  BOGLE, supra note 5, at 159–60 (“[F]und managers have arrogated to
themselves an excessive share of the financial markets’ returns[] and left fund owners 
with a commensurately inferior share.”); Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 131–32. 
175. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 153, at 99 (“By setting the default rule in 
favor of the uninformed party, the courts induce the informed party to reveal 
information, and, consequently, the efficient contract results.”).
176. Karkkainen, supra note 160, at 869. 
177. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 153, at 124 (“[I]f a penalty default is chosen 
to encourage one party to reveal information to another, the court may want to regulate 
the process of contracting around the default so that meaningful information is 
conveyed.”); infra Part V.A.3.b. 
178. In this regard, a penalty default level of advisory fees can be likened to Professor
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3. Designing the Default 
In order to accomplish these objectives, the Commission should 
structure the default in such a way as to maximize its negotiation-
inducing and information-producing functions.  Accordingly, this Comment
proposes two potential benchmark models and suggests that the 
Commission adopt procedural rules around the default in order to ensure 
that investment advisers produce relevant information. 
a. Benchmarking Fees 
If the goal of the penalty default rule is to give a more informed 
contracting party an incentive to reveal information to a less informed
party, the regulator should set the default against the more informed
party.179 Accordingly, and as the above discussion has already 
presupposed, the Commission should set the proposed default fee 
structure at a level unfavorable to investment advisers.180  All evidence 
points to the fact that investment advisers systematically possess more
information than mutual funds’ independent directors.181  Investment
advisers frequently contract to provide portfolio management services to
mutual funds,182 whereas funds’ independent directors may have no
experience in the mutual fund industry beyond their service as board 
members.183  Thus, the Commission must determine how—and by how
much—to set the default against investment advisers.
The most obvious solution would set the penalty default at a uniform 
level tied to a particular market indicator, such as the average of the
65. Karkkainen, supra note 160, at 875.  Under Proposition 65’s regulatory scheme, a 
polluter who refuses to cooperate with regulators is exposed to potential civil liability. 
Id.  Similarly, under the penalty default regime proposed in this Comment, an investment
adviser who refuses to cooperate with a mutual fund’s independent directors— 
the relevant regulators—will potentially receive an unprofitable level of advisory fees. 
179. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 153, at 98. 
180. See supra Part V.A.2. 
181. See BOGLE, supra note 5, at 172–73 (suggesting that mutual funds’ disinterested
directors are “less-well-informed” than directors connected with management firms);
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 153, at 98 (“If one side is repeatedly in the relevant 
contractual setting while the other side rarely is, it is a sensible presumption that the 
former is better informed than the latter.”).
182. See BOGLE, supra note 5, at 172. 
183. See, e.g., Krantz v. Fid. Mgmt. & Research, Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d 150, 152 n.3


















     
   
  
 












lowest decile or quintile of mutual fund advisory fees.184 The 
Investment Company Institute annually publishes average mutual fund
expense ratios, as well as data on expense ratios in the highest and 
lowest deciles.185  However, these figures represent absolute expense
ratios and do not isolate the expenses associated with the portfolio 
advisory function.186  Because the SEC has allowed investment advisers
to commingle administrative expense categories, a penalty default set 
according to the lowest decile of mutual fund advisory fees would likely
require an accompanying rule requiring advisers to separate portfolio 
management expenses from other administrative expenses in order to 
function effectively.187  Moreover, a uniform penalty default rule tied to
such a variable indicator would likely entail significant monitoring costs, 
as the Commission would have to annually reset the default to keep pace 
with varying expense ratios.188 
Alternatively, the Commission could place the onus on investment 
advisers, tying the default to data that advisers already possess.  In 2001, 
Professors John P. Freeman and Stewart L. Brown conducted a careful
study of the mutual fund industry, focusing on mutual fund advisory
fees.189  They concluded that investment advisers routinely overcharged 
mutual fund shareholders for portfolio advisory services, especially
when compared to fees that advisers charged institutional investors for 
comparable services.190  As part of a comprehensive solution, Freeman
184. A decile is a division equal to one-tenth of a whole.  See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 298 (10th ed. 1993).  A quintile is a division equal to one-fifth
of a whole. See id. at 960. 
185. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 64.  The average expense ratio of all equity
mutual funds is 1.46%, slightly less than twice the lowest decile’s 0.79% average.  Id.
Similar information is available for free on the Internet.  See, e.g., Morningstar,
http://www.morningstar.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2010). 
186. See Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 112 (“Because of the way the SEC has allowed 
mutual funds to blur expense definitions, it is not always easy to compare mutual fund portfolio 
management fees and portfolio management fees negotiated on the free market.”).
187. See id.
188. See  INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 62 (showing annually fluctuating mutual 
fund expense ratios).
189. See Freeman & Brown, supra note 72. 
190. See id. at 672 (“The gap between prices charged funds for advisory services 
versus prices fetched elsewhere in the economy for those same services represents the 
bill paid by fund shareholders for the advisory conflict of interest that is both the fund 
industry’s hallmark and its stigma.  That tab runs into billions of dollars per year.”); see
also Tom Lauricella, This Is News? Fund Fees Are Too High, Study Says, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 27, 2001, at C1 (“Using data on 1,343 domestic-stock funds from Morningstar Inc., 
the study found that mutual funds charged an average annual advisory fee equal 
to 0.56% of investor assets in 1999.  By contrast, 1999 survey data from a third of the 
nation’s 100 largest public-employee pension funds showed they paid an average of 
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and Brown proposed that the SEC use its rulemaking authority to grant 
mutual fund shareholders “most favored nations” treatment.191  This  
proposal would have forbidden investment advisers from charging 
mutual funds more for portfolio advisory services than they charged 
pension funds and other institutional investors for comparable 
services.192  However, the Commission has not adopted Freeman and
Brown’s proposal,193 despite praise from regulators and industry
insiders.194 
This Comment proposes that the SEC convert Freeman and Brown’s 
most-favored-nations pricing proposal into a penalty default rule.  Under 
a most-favored-nations penalty default regime, each investment adviser
would have its own unique default, determined by the amount the 
adviser charged institutional investors for portfolio advisory services.195 
Investment advisers would then bear the burden of justifying upward
departures from the default by demonstrating to mutual funds’ 
independent directors why they could not provide comparable 
investment advice for the same price charged to institutional investors.196 
This approach would likely capitalize on the penalty default’s
information-sharing character because investment advisers would need 
to produce management cost and profitability data in order to demonstrate 
why managing mutual fund portfolios merits higher advisory fees than 
managing pension fund portfolios.
Given that investment advisers already possess the information 
necessary to set their own default advisory fee levels, the most-favored-
191. Freeman & Brown, supra note 72, at 661. 
192. Id.; see also Neil Weinberg, Mutual Funds’ Worst Nightmare, FORBES.COM, 
Dec. 16, 2003, http://www.forbes.com/2003/12/16/cz_nw_1216mutualfunds.html. 
193. See Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 150 (“The time has come for fund directors 
to demand that fund advisers give fund shareholders ‘most favored nation’ treatment on
advisory fees.”). 
194. See Weinberg, supra note 192. 
195. By way of example, in 2002, Alliance Capital charged approximately 0.90% of 
net assets to manage its captive Alliance Premier Growth Fund in 2002. Freeman et al., 
supra note 3, at 110–11. During the same period, Alliance Capital charged between
0.11% and 0.24% of net assets to manage portfolios of assets for pension funds and other
institutional investors. Id.  Thus, under the proposed regime, Alliance Capital’s default 
level of mutual fund advisory fees would be approximately one-quarter of the fee that it 
had charged the Alliance Premier Growth Fund in 2002. 
196. See id. at 110 (suggesting that the cost of providing investment advisory
services to mutual funds does not exceed the cost of providing investment advisory
























   
 
 
nations penalty default approach has the benefit of being self-
administering, obviating the need for an external regulator charged with 
setting default advisory fee levels.197 However, with such a self-regulatory 
mechanism, there exists a possibility of abuse and manipulation. 
Because pension fund accounts generally represent a smaller fraction of
investment advisers’ revenue than mutual fund accounts, setting the 
default at pension fund advisory fee levels may actually lead to
increased pension fund advisory fees.198  Rational investment advisers 
could determine that the benefit of gaining additional ground in 
negotiations with mutual funds’ independent directors outweighs the 
cost of lost pension fund clients, and increase pension fund advisory fees 
accordingly.
Given its likely propensity to force the production of relevant cost and
profitability data and its self-administering character, a most-favored-
nations methodology likely represents the most viable approach to
setting the default level of advisory fees.  Although investment advisers
might abuse such a self-regulatory mechanism, this supposition ignores 
the competition and arm’s length negotiation present in the pension fund 
advisory contract market.199  In contrast to the mutual fund market, a
pension fund manager can terminate its dealings with a particular 
investment adviser at any given time and take its business elsewhere.200 
Accordingly, competitive pressures will likely deter investment advisers 
from manipulating the default by raising pension fund advisory fees. 
b. Setting the Ground Rules To Ensure Information Production 
In addition to setting a penalty default against the investment adviser, 
this Comment proposes that the Commission capitalize on the default’s 
197. See id. (observing that investment advisers possess “apples-to-apples data” that 
allows them to compare the fees charged institutional investors to the fees charged
mutual fund investors). 
198. See BOGLE, supra note 5, at 199 (observing that the mutual funds managed by
Calpers’s investment advisers averaged seventeen times the size of the advisers’ pension
fund portfolios); Freeman & Brown, supra note 72, at 633 (“The average pension 
portfolio is $443 million and the average mutual fund portfolio is $1.3 billion, roughly
three times greater. Moreover, in the largest deciles of portfolios/funds, the average
mutual fund portfolio is about six times larger than the average pension portfolio.”). 
199. See Freeman & Brown, supra note 72, at 627–28 (“Investment advice is 
essentially a commodity.  Outside the fund industry, it is bought and sold in a much more 
competitive marketplace.”).
200. Compare id. at 628 (“Investment managers are regularly hired and fired and 
[institutional investors] doing the hiring enjoy the benefits of a competitive market.”),
with Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 140–41 (noting that mutual funds are generally
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information-sharing character by regulating the process by which
investment advisers may contract around the default.  If the purpose of 
the penalty default is to encourage a more informed party to reveal 
information to a less informed party, the regulator may structure the 
process of contracting around the default in order to ensure the 
production of meaningful information.201 By choosing a strong penalty
default that requires explicit contractual language or affirmative 
procedural steps to opt out of the default outcome, legislatures can
essentially require more informed contracting parties to apprise less
informed parties of their legal rights.202  Similarly, if the penalty default
is regulatory in character, the supervisory body can require the 
production of specific information in order to escape from the default 
outcome.203 
The Investment Company Act currently requires investment advisers
to furnish to mutual funds’ independent directors such information as is 
reasonably necessary to evaluate the terms of the adviser’s contract.204 
By modifying this rule in conjunction with the proposed penalty default 
regime, the Commission can ensure that investment advisers come
forward with relevant cost and profitability data that, to date, investment 
advisers have largely concealed.205  Specifically, this Comment proposes 
that the SEC use its rulemaking authority to require that, in order to 
avoid the default level of advisory fees, an investment adviser produce 
detailed data to the mutual fund’s independent directors demonstrating
why the cost of servicing the mutual fund exceeds the cost of servicing 
the adviser’s pension fund clients.206  Additionally, in keeping with its
objective of ensuring transparency in the advisory contract approval 
process, the Commission should also require mutual fund prospectuses 
to include a discussion of any decision to allow a departure from the 
201. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 153, at 124. 
202. See id.
203. See Karkkainen, supra note 160, at 875 (“Proposition 65[‘s regulatory penalty
default mechanism] invites polluters to contract around the penalty provision by cooperating 
with regulators . . . by revealing (and if necessary by generating) information needed to
establish health-protective numerical regulatory standards . . . .”).
204. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2006). 
205. See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text. 
206. In this regard, the proposed penalty default takes on a regulatory quality—it 
requires the investment adviser to produce information it asymmetrically holds in order
to secure approval for an advisory fee structure in excess of the default. See Karkkainen, 



























      
 
default.207  These measures should have the combined effect of ensuring 
that investment advisers produce relevant information and that mutual 
funds’ independent directors faithfully reflect on this information in 
considering any proposed divergence from the penalty default.208 
4. The Penalty Default’s Advantage: Cooperation 
In addition to its direct benefits of forcing negotiation and information 
production, the proposed default regime will have the collateral benefit 
of encouraging cooperation between mutual funds’ independent 
directors and investment advisers.209  Under the proposed regime, the
Commission does not act as a direct rate regulator.210  Instead, and as 
Congress envisioned in enacting the Investment Company Act, mutual
funds’ independent directors regulate the level of fees that advisers may
charge.211  The penalty default simply changes the starting point for
207. Currently, mutual fund prospectuses must include a discussion of the material 
factors considered by the board of directors in approving the adviser’s contract, including: 
(1) [T]he nature, extent, and quality of the services to be provided by
the investment adviser; (2) the investment performance of the fund and the 
investment adviser; (3) the costs of the services to be provided and profits to be 
realized by the investment adviser and its affiliates from the relationship with 
the fund; (4) the extent to which economies of scale would be realized as the 
fund grows; and (5) whether fee levels reflect these economies of scale for the 
benefit of fund investors. 
Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of
Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,486 [2004 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,232, at 80,632 (June 23, 2004).  These factors 
largely track the Gartenberg analysis.  See Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 875 F.2d
404, 409 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d
923, 929–30 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
208. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (“It shall be the duty of the directors of a registered 
investment company to request and evaluate . . . such information as may reasonably be
necessary to evaluate the terms of any contract whereby a person undertakes regularly to 
serve or act as investment adviser of such company.”).
209. See Karkkainen, supra note 160, at 902 (arguing that regulatory penalty defaults 
may be superior to prescriptive regulation). 
210. In enacting section 36(b), Congress indicated that it did not desire to directly
regulate mutual fund advisory fees.  See S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 6 (1969), as reprinted in
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4902 (“[Section 36(b)] is not intended to introduce general
concepts of rate regulation as applied to public utilities.”).
211. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484 (1979) (“Congress’[s] purpose in
structuring the [Investment Company] Act as it did is clear.  It was designed to place the
unaffiliated directors in the role of independent watchdogs, who would furnish an 
independent check upon the management of investment companies.” (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Alan R. Palmiter, The Mutual Fund Board: A Failed 
Experiment in Regulatory Outsourcing, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 165, 165 
(2006) (observing that Congress delegated the negotiation of advisory fees to mutual
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negotiations, giving the initial advantage to mutual funds’ traditionally 
less informed independent directors.212  So long as the parties comply 
with such regulations as the Commission may set for bargaining around
the default, they are free to negotiate a mutually advantageous fee 
structure in excess of the default.213  Accordingly, the proposed regime 
will likely foster genuine cooperation between investment advisers and
mutual fund boards of directors, preventing advisers from dominating 
advisory contract negotiations to shareholders’ detriment.214 
B. An Alternative Default Proposal: Make Competition Happen 
Recognizing that the Commission and the mutual fund industry might 
be resistant to such a sweeping reform proposal, this Comment also
offers a more reserved proposal that Congress might implement in order 
to provide the parties with an introduction to the structure and efficacy of
default rules. Specifically, this Comment proposes that Congress condition 
pension fund administrators’ exemption from liability under section
404(c) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act215 (ERISA) on 
default enrollment in low-advisory-fee mutual funds.216 
In 2008, 59% of mutual fund shareholders invested in funds through 
401(k) and other defined contribution retirement plans.217  The vast 
majority of plan administrators structure these defined contribution 
retirement plans so that individual contributors may direct all or part of 
212. See Karkkainen, supra note 160, at 902 (“Regulatory penalty defaults change
the baseline for negotiation . . . .”).
213. See id. at 901 (“[R]egulatory penalty default rules appear suitable for
adaptation to a new role—creating incentives for parties to enter into collaborative new
governance arrangements in good faith pursuit of . . . beneficial outcomes to avoid the 
harsher consequences that might follow from failure to do so.”). 
214. See id. at 902 (“Regulatory penalty defaults . . . make genuine cooperation 
more attractive than shirking or strategic bargaining.”); Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New 
Model for Securities Law Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 821–22 (2005) (arguing 
that cooperative new governance models of regulation can shift traditionally adversarial 
processes toward collaborative reform efforts). 
215. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006).  For the operation of the exemption section 404(c)
allows, see infra note 218 and accompanying text. 
216. As with the penalty default regime proposed above, Congress could condition 
the section 404(c) exemption’s availability on default enrollment in mutual funds that 
charge in the industry’s lowest decile or quintile. See supra notes 185–88 and accompanying 
text.
 217. INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 77.  Mutual funds accounted for 47% of the 































their investments, allowing administrators to avoid potential fiduciary
liability.218  However, many individuals who participate in defined
contribution retirement plans lack sufficient investing sophistication to
adequately exercise control over their assets.219  As a result, an overwhelming
majority of individuals choose their plan’s default investment fund.220 
Individuals who save for retirement through defined contribution
retirement plans are often limited to investing in those mutual funds 
offered by their retirement plans.221  As a result, investors frequently do 
not withdraw from mutual fund investments even in the face of high 
advisory fees.222  This “stickiness” increases the transactions costs
associated with shifting assets to mutual funds charging lower advisory
fees, hindering mutual fund investors’ ability to discipline investment 
advisers who charge above market fees.223 
In light of this conflict, Congress and the Department of Labor— 
responsible for administering ERISA—should require that defined
contribution retirement plans’ default investment funds only contain 
low-advisory-fee mutual funds.224  Specifically, Congress should condition 
plan administrators’ section 404(c) liability exemption on inclusion of
only low-advisory-fee mutual funds in plans’ default investment funds. 
This proposal would have two primary effects.  First, by automatically
enrolling individuals who choose their retirement plan’s default investment
fund, the rule would protect uninformed investors’ retirement savings 
218. See DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP, ANNUAL 401(K) BENCHMARKING SURVEY 21 (2006),
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/us_consulting_hc_401ksurveyresults_020806.pdf 
(indicating that 80% of responding 401(k) plan sponsors provided a statement that they
intended to comply with ERISA section 404(c) protection).  Section 404(a) of ERISA 
imposes a stringent standard of care on pension plan fiduciaries. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a) (2006).  However, if the plan allows beneficiaries to exercise control over their
own accounts, section 404(c) exempts from liability plan administrators who would
otherwise be fiduciaries.  Id. § 1104(c); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2008).  See 
generally Debra A. Davis, Do-It-Yourself Retirement: Allowing Employees To Direct the 
Investment of Their Retirement Savings, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 353, 356–60 (2006). 
219. See Davis, supra note 218, at 367–68. 
220. Id. (citing Julie Agnew & Lisa R. Szykman, Asset Allocation and Information 
Overload: The Influence of Information Display, Asset Choice and Investor Experience 3 
(Ctr. for Ret. Research, Working Paper No. 2004-15), available at http://escholarship.
bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1088&context=retirement_papers). 
221. Memorandum from Chester Spatt, supra note 90, at 10. 
222. Id.
223. Id. at 9. 
224. Thus, if a defined contribution retirement plan only offered to its participants 
mutual funds from one fund family, this proposal would require the plan administrator to 
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from the detrimental effect of high mutual fund advisory fees.225  Given
that virtually no correlation exists between advisory fees and fund 
performance, there is minimal risk that default enrollment in low cost
funds would adversely affect investment returns.226  Second, and perhaps
more importantly, requiring that defined contribution retirement plans’ 
default investment funds only contain low-advisory-fee mutual funds 
will encourage price competition among mutual funds.  Mutual funds 
and their investment advisers cannot ignore the relatively large segment 
of investors who invest through their retirement plans’ default investment 
funds.227  Rather, this default rule will likely force investment advisers to 
lower advisory fees to vie for inclusion in retirement plans’ default
investment funds, providing some palliative effect on the current lack of 
price competition in the mutual fund industry.228 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As a result of mutual funds’ conflicted governance structure and the 
associated lack of price competition, excessive advisory fees have 
flourished. Moreover, a review of the case law and extant literature
demonstrates that Congress’s attempt to regulate advisory fees through 
litigation has not met with success. Courts have turned the proposed 
fiduciary duty standard into an onerous, insurmountable burden of proof. 
Although some commentators argue that the time has come to
restructure mutual funds entirely, this Comment proposes to work within
the existing framework to affect independent director behavior and 
foster the arm’s length negotiation of portfolio management contracts 
that Congress sought in enacting section 36(b).229  By enacting the proposed 
penalty default regime, Congress can give mutual funds’ independent 
225. See BOGLE, supra note 5, at 161 (“Investing on the basis of relative costs alone, 
then, fund investors would have improved their ten-year profit by 75 percent . . . .”); see 
also THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 28, at 129–30 (discussing default options’ role in
protecting investors).
226. See BOGLE, supra note 5, at 160. 
227. See supra text accompanying notes 217–20. 
228. See supra Part IV.B. 
229. See, e.g., WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 5, at 99–120 (proposing that mutual 
funds be structured as management investment trusts, in which investors contract directly
with investment advisers); Palmiter, supra note 211, at 207–08 (suggesting that mutual 
funds be structured without boards such that investors purchase portfolio management 






directors the upper hand in negotiation, fostering the type of arm’s 
length bargaining Congress and the Commission intended section 36(b) 
to accomplish.  Given the importance of mutual funds to American
investors, Congress and the SEC should attempt to overhaul the current
Investment Company Act before they take any steps that might threaten
investors’ retirement security. 
226
